Automatic Perfection of Sales of Payment Intangibles: A
Trap for the Unwary 1

STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ*

Under Section 9-309(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, sales of “payment intangibles” are
automatically perfected without the requirement of filing financing statements. Originally intended
as a concession to the banking industry (to perfect sales of loan participations without filing), this
provision has become a trap for the unwary—including unwary banks. It misleads those who think
they’re buying payment intangibles (and thus need not file to perfect) only to find out, too late,
that a court has construed that arcane definition too narrowly. It also undermines the ability to
know one’s priority in purchased or pledged payment intangibles. This essay analyses these
problems, examines their historical origins, and suggests potential solutions.

Introduction. A bank pays $47 million, fair value, to purchase certain rights to payment
under equipment leases. The seller of these rights eventually goes bankrupt, and its trustee in
bankruptcy claims that the seller—not the bank—actually owns these rights even though they
were purportedly sold. This nightmarish scenario is real, and indeed has been “blessed” by a
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bankruptcy court.2 Most troubling, the trustee in bankruptcy’s claim and the bankruptcy court’s
decision are not based on any hint of fraud or inequities; rather, they result from a well
intentioned, though misguided, provision of revised Article 9 (“Revised Article 9”) of the
Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”)—Section 9-309(3), providing for automatic perfection of
sales of payment intangibles.
“Automatic perfection” means that sales of payment intangibles are perfected when they
occur,3 without the need to file financing statements (filing being the U.C.C.’s default rule for
perfection4). The automatic-perfection rule originated in a political compromise between the
drafters of Revised Article 9 and the banking lobby. When Revised Article 9 expanded the
category of intangible rights whose sale was governed by the U.C.C.,5 banks realized the
expansion would include loan participations, a form of payment intangible consisting of
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Or, more technically, when they “attach” under U.C.C. § 9-203(a) (2005).
See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2005).
The U.C.C. governs certain sales of intangible rights to “avoid[] difficult problems of distinguishing
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undivided interests in loans.6 They then became concerned that requiring perfection by filing
could be burdensome and costly to the large inter-bank market in loan-participation sales.
Banks argued that, prior to Revised Article 9, they were not required to file financing
statements to perfect sales of loan participations,7 so automatic perfection would simply reflect
existing banking practice.8 Although the drafters of Revised Article 9 ultimately accepted
automatic perfection as a compromise, this essay shows that it is a compromise that creates traps
for the unwary—and that, ironically, banks are among those most likely to fall into these traps.
Problems Caused by Automatic Perfection:

Automatic perfection causes two

fundamental problems—one a “non-perfection” problem, the other a “priority” problem. The
non-perfection problem results from certain complexities and subtleties, discussed in the next
paragraph, associated with the term “payment intangibles.” These complexities and subtleties can
make it hard for a buyer of intangible rights to determine whether its rights are payment
intangibles, which are automatically perfected, or other intangible rights for which the U.C.C.
requires filing for perfection. If the buyer decides wrong and does not file, the buyer’s ownership
of those rights can be avoided in the event of the seller’s subsequent bankruptcy. Avoidance
occurs through the mechanism of U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2), which provides that an unperfected
security interest—which, under U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(35) and 9-109 (and Official Comment 5
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thereto), includes most ownership interests in intangible rights—is subordinate to the rights of a
trustee in bankruptcy.9
Payment intangibles are defined as “general intangible[s] under which the account
debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary obligation.”10 Confusion can arise because the term
“general intangible” is a catch-all, consisting effectively of all intangible rights “other than
accounts, chattel paper” and other such U.C.C.-delineated categories of intangible rights. In order
to conclude an intangible right is a payment intangible, one first must conclude it does not fall
within any of these other categories. These categories, however, can be complex and exceedingly
subtle.
For example, in In re Commercial Money Center, the intangible rights at issue consisted
of rights to payment to certain lease installments. NetBank believed, in my view correctly, that
these intangible rights were payment intangibles, not falling within any other U.C.C.-delineated
category of intangible rights. The trustee in bankruptcy argued, though, that these intangible
rights constituted “chattel paper” because that term includes “a record or records that evidence
both a monetary obligation and a … lease of specific goods.”11 Although NetBank countered that
the intangible rights could not be chattel paper because they neither constitute a “record” nor
“evidence” the lease—rather, they were merely rights payable under the lease—the bankruptcy
judge disagreed. Holding (in my view, incorrectly) that the intangible rights were chattel paper,
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the judge then concluded (correctly, given that flawed premise) that their sale required perfection
by filing. Because NetBank had not filed financing statements, it was unperfected.
The disagreement over the U.C.C. nature of rights to payment under leases illustrated by
the bankruptcy court’s decision in In re Commercial Money Center is disturbing because that
should have been a relatively easy case.12 Two prominent commercial law commentators have
observed, for example:
Our biggest concern about the [bankruptcy court’s decision in the In re Commercial
Money Center] case is its holding that the rental streams, standing by themselves, should
be characterized as chattel paper rather than payment intangibles. The court thought its
decision was true to the “plain language” of the U.C.C., but that’s questionable . . . . The
carved-out payment streams seem to fit the definition of “payment intangible” like a
glove.13

Indeed, it appears that banks may routinely regard rights to payment under leases as payment
intangibles, and therefore do not file to perfect the sale of those rights.14
That this degree of controversy exists for so obvious an example of a payment intangible
augers poorly for the many truly more difficult cases. And the In re Commercial Money Center
bankruptcy court’s interpretation of § 9-309(3), if sustained on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, only
compounds the controversy, suggesting, for example, that even participations in equipment loans
could be chattel paper whose sale requires perfection by filing.15
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Some might propose solving this problem by filing financing statements for all sales of
intangible rights, as a prophylactic measure. But § 9-309(3) would still remain a trap for the
unwary who, after reading § 9-309(3), justifiably believe they are automatically perfected and fail
to file prophylactically. Furthermore, any widespread practice of prophylactic filing for sales of
intangible rights could amount to roughly the same filing costs and burdens as simply requiring
such filing in the first place. Additionally, even a universal practice of prophylactic filing could
not solve the “priority” problem (discussed below), which exists independently of the nonperfection problem.
The priority problem occurs because automatic perfection makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to know one’s priority in purchased or pledged payment intangibles. Whereas the
U.C.C. filing system not only establishes but also is used to enable one to ascertain priority,
payment intangibles sold pursuant to an automatic-perfection rule do not require filing. Any
subsequent buyer of, or party secured by, those payment intangibles must therefore take the
transferor’s word that such intangibles have not been previously sold. If the transferor is
dishonest—indeed, even if the transferor is merely mistaken about the existence of a prior sale—
the subsequent buyer or secured party’s interest would be subordinate to the rights of prior
automatically perfected buyers. The inability to know ownership priority in turn undermines the
market for selling intangible rights and increases costs where sales do occur.16

Potential Solutions to These Problems: There are at least a couple of potential solutions
to these problems. Each begins by substituting a perfection-by-filing rule for sales of payment
intangibles in place of Revised Article 9’s automatic perfection rule.
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One solution is simply to eliminate the automatic-perfection rule for sales of payment
intangibles. These sales then would be perfected by filing—the U.C.C.’s default rule.17 This was
the originally intended approach of Revised Article 9.
This solution is likely to meet resistance because sales of loan participations then
technically would also require filing for perfection and, as mentioned, the banking lobby has been
concerned that requirement would be burdensome and costly to the market in inter-bank loanparticipation sales.18 Banks believed, in contrast, that automatic perfection merely reflects preRevised Article 9 banking practice.19
That belief may be misplaced, however. The fact that the sale of loan participations was
not included within the scope of the U.C.C. prior to Revised Article 9 says nothing about whether
an automatic-perfection rule then existed. Absent U.C.C. coverage, perfection of sales of loan
participations prior to Revised Article 9 was governed by the common law and lex mercatoria.20
That hodgepodge of laws in some cases resulted in automatic perfection of sales of loan
participations but in many cases did not; and where it did not, it imposed even more burdensome
and costly perfection requirements than filing, such as “policing” or notifying obligors on the
loans.21 Banks rarely, if ever, complied with these burdensome and costly perfection
requirements.22
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For this reason, many inter-bank sales of loan participations were unperfected prior to
enactment of Revised Article 9. If, therefore, the automatic perfection rule under § 9-309(3) were
replaced by a perfection-by-filing rule, banks that choose not to file often would be in no worse
position under commercial law than they had been in prior to Revised Article 9:

“‘Because few banks complied with pre-U.C.C. perfection requirements for sales of loan
participations, the failure to comply with a perfection-by-filing requirement’ would put [banks] in
no worse position than at present. Banks would take the insolvency risk of the selling bank, as
they likely do now.”23
But banks that decide to comply with such a filing requirement would be able to perfect the
sale of loan participations with far greater certainty. In short, therefore, replacing automatic
perfection of sales of payment intangibles with a rule requiring perfection by filing would
essentially place banks in a no worse, and arguably a better, position than they were in prior to
Revised Article 9.24
Another possible solution, more explicitly intended to address the banking industry’s
perceived concerns, would begin by substituting a perfection-by-filing rule for sales of payment
intangibles in place of Revised Article 9’s automatic-perfection rule; but it then would except out
sales of loan participations between banks. This approach simply recognizes that, “as between
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CommercialCalamities-LawRevEdit.doc

9
bank . . . purchases and sales of loan participations are not intended to facilitate commercial
transactions but, instead, constitute a means of allocating lending risk between such
institutions.”25
The exception could take several forms. It could provide, for example, that excepted sales
of loan participations are automatically perfected, as under Revised Article 9. Alternatively, it
could provide, as prior to Revised Article 9, that excepted sales of loan participations are not
governed by Article 9 of the U.C.C.. In each case, the challenge is to carefully define what
constitutes an excepted sale of loan participations.
At the time Revised Article 9 was being finalized, some claimed that it would be difficult
to precisely define this type of exception. I do not see why. Loan participations are simply
undivided interests in loans,26 and the term “bank” could be defined, for example, by reference to
the expansive but precise litany of banking institutions that may not be debtors under the
Bankruptcy Code.27 Indeed, a similar approach, proposed by the American Bar Association’s
Securitized Asset Financing Task Force, was substantially adopted in the Revised Article 9
Drafting Committee’s November 1995 draft report.
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I understand that because of continued banking industry opposition, this approach did not
become part of Revised Article 9.28 However, in light of the In re Commercial Money Center
debacle and the concerns laid out in this essay, perhaps it’s time that banks recognize that this
approach may well have merit—and that § 9-309(3) represents neither their best interests nor the
best interests of any other buyer or seller of, or party secured by, payment intangibles.

28
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that buy and sell loan participations. Theoretically, at least, the approach described in the text above could be
adapted to apply to any definable group of financial institutions.
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